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THE BREADTH OF SECTION 514 OF
ERISA AND THE PREEMPTIBILITY
OF STATE ANTISUBROGATION
LAWS
INTRODUCTION
The value of employee benefit plans' and the number of benefi-
ciaries under such plans have been growing at a startling rate.2
Unfortunately, this progression has been accompanied by a paral-
lel rise in the level of abuse and mismanagement of these plans.'
29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1982). An "employee benefit plan" includes both pension and
welfare plans. Id. An employee welfare plan is one established or maintained by an em-
ployer or employee organization which provides, inter alia, medical, surgical or hospital
benefits in the event of sickness, accident or disability as well as death, unemployment or
vacation benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982). An employee pension plan is a similarly es-
tablished or maintained fund which provides retirement income or deferral of income. 29
U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1982).
Prior to the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), the definition of employee benefit plans was narrower in that it did not include
pension plans. Note, Insurance Regulation - Employee Benefit Plans, 28 ARK. L. REV. 515, 515
n.l (1975). "Employee benefit plans are arrangements through which employees are pro-
vided hospital, surgical, death and disability benefits as a fringe benefit by the employer."
Id. at 515.
' See H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4641. In 1950, an estimated 10 million employees were covered by
private pension plans, while in 1979 that number had increased to nearly 30 million par-
ticipants. Id.
The increase in the number of employee participants has led to a dramatic rise in the
funds allocated to employee benefit plans. Id. In 1973, that amount totalled $150 billion.
Id. In 1940, the amount of private pension assets was only $2.4 billion. See Williams, Devel-
opment of the New Pension Reform Law, 26 LAB. L.J. 135, 135 (1975). See also Kaiser, Labor's
New Weapon: Pension Fund Leverage - Can Labor Legally Beat Its Plowshares into Swords?, 34
RurGERS L. REV. 409, 409 (1982) (pension plans "represent the world's largest identifiable
source of private wealth"); Note, An Employer's Implied Cause of Action For Restitution Under
Section 403 of ERISA, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 225 (1985) (noting startling expansion of
pension plan coverage). See generally L. LITVAK, PENSION FUNDS AND ECONOMIC RENEWAL
(1981) (describing the significant impact pension funds have on the national economy).
I B. COLEMAN, PRIMER ON ERISA, at xi (2d ed. 1985). "The major impetus for the enact-
ment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 was abuse and mismanage-
ment in the private pension system." Id. See also Turza & Halloway, Preemption of State Laws
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 28 CATM. UL. REv. 163, 164 (1979)
(ERISA was designed to protect employee benefit plans from abuse); Gregory, The Scope of
ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study In Effective Federalism, 48 U. PIrr. L. REV. 427, 443-
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Accordingly, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),4 intending to protect the interests
of employees in both welfare benefit and pension plans through a
comprehensive overhaul of existing private employee benefit
systems.6
Recognizing employee benefit plans to be national in scope,6
Congress desired to set minimum federal standards by imposing a
uniform regulatory scheme.7 Section 5148 of ERISA was there-
45 (1987) (mismanagement of employee benefit plans by corrupt employers taking advan-
tage of uninformed employees); Note, Unfunded Vacation Benefits: Determining the Scope of
ERISA, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1702, 1704 (1987) ("Evidence of corruption and mismanage-
ment of welfare and pension plans had existed for years .... ).
' The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982)) [hereinafter referred to as ERISA
or the Act]. For excellent discussion on the subject of ERISA see D. LOGUE, LEGISLATIVE
INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE PENSION PLANS (1979); Snyder, Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 219 (1975); Symposium, Litigation under ERISA, 71
CORNELL L. REV. 949 (1986). To avoid confusion, section numbers used in the text will be
those of ERISA rather than Title 29 of the United States Code. Each section will be foot-
noted to 29 U.S.C. the initial time it is referred to herein.
' See S. 1103, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 29,934 (1974). From this initial bill,
introduced in 1967 by Senator Jacob Javits of New York, evolved the modern day ERISA
statute which evinces the same comprehensive nature of the initial bill. See 29 U.S.C. §
1001 (1982). For a comprehensive analysis of the bill process leading up to ERISA, see
Gregory, supra note 3, at 445 n.59; see also Kilberg & Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relat-
ing to Employee Benefit Plans: An Analysis of ERISA Section 514, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1313, 1313
(1984) ("With the passage of ERISA, Congress imposed comprehensive federal oversight
of employee benefit plans .... ). See also Levin, Proposals to Eliminate Inequitable Loss of
Pension Benefits, 15 VILL. L. REV. 527 (1970) (discusses remedies needed prior to adoption of
ERISA).
' See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1982). Congress appropriately noted that employee benefit
plans were "affected with a national public interest." Id. Given the large impact such plans
have on the entire population, Congress noted the increasingly interstate nature of em-
ployee benefit plans and the effect that the security of such plans have on covered employ-
ees. See Turza & Halloway, supra note 3, at 165-66; see generally Coleman, supra note 3,
passim (broad discussion of ERISA).
29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1982). This section states:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act to protect interstate commerce and
the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by re-
quiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and
other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, respon-
sibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for
appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal Courts.
Id.
Congress further declared that it is "the policy of this Act ... to meet minimum stan-
dards of funding .... 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1982).
' The preemption provisions of ERISA are codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)-(d) (1985).
Section 1144(d) asserts that, although broad, ERISA does not supersede federal law. See
also infra notes 30-39 and accompanying text (setting forth in detail the statutory scheme
ERISA
fore implemented to grant the federal government control of the
field by preempting the states' authority with respect to employee
benefit plans.9 Despite the broad language of the preemption
clause itself (section 514(a)), 10 much litigation has resulted con-
cerning the breadth of section 514 as a whole," Courts have been
called upon to set guidelines for applying section 514 in areas of
traditional state concern which nonetheless impact on employee
benefit plans.12 One frequently litigated issue over which courts
are divided involves whether state antisubrogation laws are pre-
empted by ERISA.'3 This division is highlighted by two recent
of the preemption provision).
* Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 77 (lst Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980
(1978). In interpreting the legislative intent, the Wadsworth court recognized that "during
conference, the language limiting preemption was replaced by the present sweeping pre-
emption language." Id.
Numerous courts, from the United States Supreme Court to the district courts, have
reaffirmed the breadth of the preemptive power of § 514. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (preemption clause to be applied with broad sweep);
Sejman v. Warner-Lambert Co., Inc., 845 F.2d 66, 68 (4th Cir. 1988) (referring to section
514 as "the most sweeping preemption statute ever enacted by Congress.") (citing Califor-
nia Hosp. Assoc. v. Henning, 569 F. Supp. 1544 (C.D. Cal. 1983)).
l" See supra note 9. See also infra notes 25-31 and accompanying text (discussing the pre-
emption clause of ERISA).
" See Annotation, Construction and Application of Preemption Exemption, Under Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq.), For State Laws Regulating Insurance,
Banking, or Securities (29 U.S.C.S. § 1144(bX2)), 87 A.L.R. FED. 797 (1988) (John F. Wagner,
Jr.) (detailed analysis and case history on the preemption clause of ERISA).
The breadth of ERISA's preemption provision has frequently been challenged. See, e.g.,
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (state antidiscrimination law at issue);
AT&T v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979) (state family support law at issue); Blue Cross
& Blue Shield v. Peacock's Apothecary, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Ala. 1983) (state
pharmaceutical law at issue); Gast v. Stevenson, 36 Or. App. 441, 585 P.2d 12 (1978) (state
sex discrimination statute at issue); see also Gregory, supra note 3, at 462 n.129 (providing
two lists of preemption cases which upheld or struck down state law).
" See supra note 11. See also infra notes 39-65 and accompanying text (discussing court-
employed test for applying ERISA preemption clause).
Numerous scholars have acknowledged that it is the duty of the judiciary to establish a
standard for determining the scope of section 514. See Brummond, Federal Preemption of
State Insurance Regulation Under ERISA, 62 IowA L. REV. 57, 93 (1976). It is asserted that it
is the courts who will ultimately decide the scope of the ERISA preemption provision. Id.
But see Rindler & Miller, Thoughts On A Faded Peacock. The Effect of ERISA's Preemption Provi-
sion On State Third Party Prescription Drug Program Statutes, 39 VAND. L. REV. 23, 25 (1986)
(judicial guidelines are "metaphorical rather than functional").
"3 See, e.g., Baxter v. Lynn, 886 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1989) (state antisubrogation law pre-
empted by ERISA); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 885 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1989) (Pennsylvania an-
tisubrogation statute not preempted by ERISA); United Food & Commercial Workers v.
Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1986) (Arizona antisubrogation law preempted by
ERISA); Davis v. Line Constr. Benefit Fund, 589 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (Missouri
law of subrogation preempted by ERISA); Hunt by Hunt v. Sherman, 345 N.W.2d 750
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court of appeals decisions where the Third and Eighth Circuits
drew contrary conclusions."
This Note will argue that since congressional intent clearly sup-
ports a broad interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause, the
correct view is that adopted by the Eighth Circuit which held that
ERISA should preempt state law governing an employee's right to
avoid subrogation to the employee benefit plan program. Further,
it will be submitted that a contrary finding would conflict with the
legislative purpose behind ERISA, while simultaneously impeding
the voluntary participation of employers in the formation of em-
ployee benefit plans.
Part I of this Note will discuss the statutory scheme of the pre-
emption clause contained within ERISA;"' Part II will set forth
the common law based test for determining the applicability of
ERISA's preemption provision;"6 Part III will discuss the most re-
cent circuit court decisions and how they applied this test to state
antisubrogation laws;" Part IV will evaluate the appropriate
breadth to be given the preemptive measure of ERISA in light of
the legislative history and how the United States Supreme Court
has interpreted the congressional intent; 8 finally, Part V will sug-
gest that the imposition of state antisubrogation laws upon em-
ployee benefit plans will serve to diminish the willingness of em-
ployers to create these plans. 9
I. THE PREEMPTION CLAUSE OF ERISA
A. History of Preemption
Pursuant to the supremacy clause of the United States Constitu-
tion, any statute which is enacted by Congress automatically be-
comes "the supreme Law of the Land."20 Where Congress has
(Minn. 1984) (Minnesota subrogation law preempted by ERISA).
"' Baxter v. Lynn, 886 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1989); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 885 F.2d 79
(3d Cir. 1989).
" See infra notes 20-38 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 39-65 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 66-110 and accompanying text.
"S See infra notes 111-146 and accompanying text.
'" See infra notes 147-155 and accompanying text.
0 U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2. See also infra note 21 (discussing supremacy clause).
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ERISA
validly enacted legislation in a given area, conflicting state law
within that area is generally held to be preempted.2 There are
two tests the Court utilizes in order to determine whether the fed-
eral law will preempt state law: (1) whether Congress intended to
"occupy the field" in passing the legislation, and (2) whether state
law directly conflicts with the federal law. 2 Thus, a valid federal
21 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (state regulation cannot be "an obsta-
cle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.").
'[T]he Court generally infers that supplementary state regulations are to be pre-
empted either because of an inference that the federal [law's] failure to establish
similar regulations represents an agency judgment that they are not needed or be-
cause of the operation of other presumptive conditions such as the need for national
uniformity."
Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.J.F. 515, 549 (1972) (citing
Oregon-Wash. R.R. & Navigation Co. v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87 (1926)). "The federal
preemption doctrine is invoked under the supremacy clause, either to effectuate a congres-
sional design to occupy a particular field, even where there are gaps in the federal regula-
tory scheme, or to nullify state regulation in conflict with federal legislation." Note, Pre-
emption Doctrine: State Prohibition Against the Employment of Illegal Aliens, 3 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 237, 240 (1978) (citing Freeman, Dynamic Federalism and the Concept of Preemption, 21
DE PAUL L. REv. 630, 638-39 (1972)).
"2 See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 140 (1963); Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229-30 (1947).
The Court in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), set forth three different
theories, the application of any one of which would require that federal law prevail over
state law:
First, "[t]he scheme of federal regulation [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it .... "
Second, the federal statutes "touch a field in which the federal interest is so domi-
nant that the federal system [must] be assumed to preclude enforcement on the same
subject ...."
Third, enforcement of [the state act] presents a serious danger of conflict with ad-
ministration of the federal program.
Nelson, 350 U.S. at 502-05 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. at 230); see
Hirsch, supra note 21, at 530 (discussing requirement for preemption where need for na-
tional uniformity demands it).
"When the Court has encountered a federal act in the.., category.., of 'occupying the
field' regarding a particular subject, it has regularly declared that the states are precluded
from regulating that subject in any way." Hirsch, supra, at 529.
Generally, however, the courts are "guided by respect for the separate spheres of gov-
ernmental authority preserved in our federalist system." Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,
451 U.S. 504, 522 (1981); See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (if field
has traditionally been regulated by the states, preemption of state laws requires express
congressional intent); Rice 331 U.S. at 230 ("historic police powers of the States were not
to be superseded by Federal Acts unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Con-
gress") (citing Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926)); Florida Lime
& Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 142 (federal regulation should not preempt state regulation
unless nature of subject matter or Congress so requires); Turza & Halloway, supra note 3,
at 176 ("In all cases, the Court looks for evidence of congressional intent to preempt.").
But see Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288
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law which explicitly prohibits state regulation in a particular field
presents no difficulty." Problems do arise, however, when the fed-
eral statute at issue is not clear and concise in the breadth or
scope of its preemptive intent;24 the preemption clause contained
in ERISA falls into this category.
B. The Statutory Scheme
As previously noted, in enacting ERISA Congress sought to
achieve strict uniformity among laws regulating employee benefit
plans.2 5 ERISA's comprehensive preemption provision serves to
n.29 (1981) ("There are situations in which the nature of the federal interest advanced
may be such that it justifies state submission."); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. at 67 ("there
can be no one crystal clear distinctly marked formula"); Note, Preemption As a Preferential
Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208, 209 (1959) ("by framing the
preemption question in terms of specific congressional intent [the Court] manufactured
difficulties for itself").
13 Hewlett-Packard v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1297 (N.D. Cal. 1977), affd, 571 F.2d
502 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978). "When Congress exercises a granted power
in a field which states have traditionally occupied, and unmistakably evinces its intent to
exclude states from exerting their police power in that field, the federal legislation may
displace state law under the Supremacy Clause." Id. See supra note 21 (broad discussion of
federal power to preempt).
Rice, 331 U.S. at 230-31. "It is often a perplexing question whether Congress has
precluded state action or by the choice of selective regulatory measures has left the police
power of the States undisturbed except as the state and federal regulations collide." Id.
(citing Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441 (1937)).
"s Holland v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir. 1985) ("[A] major
policy objective of ERISA [is] uniformity in employee benefit laws.") (emphasis omitted));
Bell v. Employee Sec. Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382, 386 (D. Kan. 1977) ("[T]he emer-
gence of a comprehensive and pervasive federal interest and the interests of uniformity
with respect to interstate plans required ... the displacement of state action in the field of
private employee benefit programs.") (quoting 120 CONG. REc. at 29,942 (1974) (Statement
of Sen. Javits)); Engel, ERISA: To Preempt or Not to Preempt, That Is a Question!, 22 TORT &
INS. L.J. 431, 431-32 (1987) (ERISA "has as a primary objective complete uniformity in
employee welfare benefit plan laws through the ouster of all state laws relating to such
plans.") (emphasis in original); see 120 CONG. REC. S15,737 (reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5188-89) ("It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions
specified in the bill, the substantive and enforcement provisions of the [bill] are intended to
preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or in-
consistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans.") (Statement of Hon. Har-
rison A. Williams, Jr., Chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
upon introducing the conference report on H.R. 2, August 22, 1974); 120 CONG. REc. at
29,942 (1974) ("With the preemption of the field [of employee benefit plans], we round
out the protection afforded participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting and incon-
sistent state laws." (Statement of Congressman John Dent, Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Labor of the House Labor & Education Committee in floor debate prior to passage of
ERISA)); Activity Report of Committee on Education and Labor of the U.S. House of
Representatives, H.R. REP. 94-1785 at 47 (1977) ("[Tlhe Federal interest and the need for
ERISA
drastically curtail state regulatory authority within this area."0
Characterized as "the most sweeping federal preemption statute
ever enacted by Congress, '2 7 the intent was to supplant all perti-
nent state law, including those which are consistent with ERISA's
provisions.2 8 Section 514 is divided into three clauses: the preemp-
tion clause (§ 514(a)), the savings clause (§ 514(b)(2)(A)), and the
deemer clause (§ 514(b)(2)(B)). These will be discussed in greater
detail below.
ERISA's preemption provision is embodied in section 514 (a) of
the Act.29 This section expressly states that ERISA "shall super-
sede any and all State laws insofar as they ... relate to any em-
ployee benefit plan ... "80 As such, any state legislation found to
"relate to" an employee benefit plan is invalid.3'
national uniformity are so great that enforcement of state regulation should be
precluded.").
" Bell v. Employee Sec. Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382, 388 (D. Kan. 1977)
("[Clongress intended to prevent states from regulating in any manner 'employee benefit
plans.' "); AcTIvITY REPORT OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1977), HR. REP. No. 1785 (language of ERISA preemption section clearly shows
intent of Congress to expressly extend federal authority "to occupy the field to the exclu-
sion of state authority"); Engle, supra note 25, at 432 (1987) (ERISA ousts all state !aw);
Turza & Halloway, supra note 3, at 167 ("[T]he broad preemption language finally
adopted by Congress in 1974 provides for the displacement of all state laws, with certain
exceptions, relating to pension and welfare plans."); see Statement of Sen. Williams and
Congressman Dent, supra note 25. But see Lanam, Public Regulation of Self-Insured and Unin-
sured Employee Benefit Plans - Who Is To Be Protected? A State Regulator's Perspective, 19 FORUM
309, 313 (1984) ("[T]here is virtually no evidence that Congress considered the impact of
such an apparently sweeping preemption on the variety of state laws which in some way
regulate employee benefit plans.").
"7 California Hosp. Ass'n v. Henning, 569 F. Supp. 1544, 1546 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
2" Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985). See Fitzgerald
v. Codex Co., 882 F.2d 586, 588 (1st Cir. 1989) (intent of Congress to displace common
law and state law remedies with ERISA); Helms v. Monsanto Co., Inc., 728 F.2d 1416,
1419-20 (1 Ith Cir. 1984) ("Congress intend[ed] to preempt the entire field of law involving
employee benefit plans subject to ERISA."); Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 77 (1st
Cir. 1977) ("The legislative history manifests that Congress intended to preempt all state
laws that relate to employee benefit plans and not just state laws which purport to regulate
an area expressly covered by ERISA." (emphasis in original)).
29 ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982), states:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter
and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section
1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title. This section
shall take effect on January 1, 1975.
ld.
'0 Id.
"' See infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (discussing first prong of court-employed
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This broad preemptive measure, however, must not be read in-
dependently, for the second part of the preemption provision
qualifies the sweeping effect of section 514(a). 2 This provision,
frequently referred to as the "savings clause," 33 states that noth-
ing contained within the preemption clause of section 514(a)
"shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law
of any State which regulates insurance, banking or securities.""4
For example, a state regulation of premium payments under an
insurance contract would be exempt from ERISA's preemptive ef-
fect because of the savings clause.
The third clause of this preemption provision triad, the
"deemer clause," 5 which serves to materially limit the savings
clause,3 6 provides that "[n]either an employee benefit plan.., nor
any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an
insurance company or other insurer ... for purposes of any law of
any State purporting to regulate insurance . . . ."" The deemer
clause, therefore, prevents a state from circumventing ERISA's
preemption provisions by asserting that an employee benefit plan
constitutes insurance within the meaning of the savings clause. 8
test of applicability of preemption provision).
32 Note, ERISA and the Preemption of State Law, 6 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 599, 603-04 (1978).
s ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C . § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1982), provides: "Except as pro-
vided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subehapter shall be construed to exempt or re-
lieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking or securi-
ties." Id.
Id.
" ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1982), provides:
Neither an employee benefit plan described in section § 1003(a) of this title, which is
not exempt under section § 1003(b) of this title (other than a plan established pri-
marily for the purpose of providing death benefits), nor any trust established under
such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank,
trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance
or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance
companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies or investment companies.
Id.
s Note, supra note 32, at 604.
', ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
38 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 571 F.2d 502, 504 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
831 (1978). "Although section 514(b)(2)(A) exempts from preemption state regulation of
insurance, section 514(b)(2)(B) provides that employee benefit plans may not be considered
to be in the business of insurance for purposes of exception to preemption." Id. (citing
Barnes, 425 F. Supp. at 1300 (N.D. Cal. 1977), affid, 571 F.2d 502 (1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 831 (1978)). "In seeking to regulate plaintiff's plans pursuant to [the state insurance
regulation] under the theory that the statute applies to and that such plans constitute 'in-
surance,' the defendant contravenes the clear intent of § 514(a) and (b) of ERISA that
ERISA
II. TEST OF APPLICABILITY OF ERISA SECTION 514
In determining whether a state law is preempted by section
514(a), courts have followed a three-prong test laid down by the
Supreme Court in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts.9
Initially, a court will determine if the state law in question "re-
lates to" an employee benefit plan.' 0 This occurs, for example,
where a state legislates minimum coverage requirements for all
employees."1 In making this initial determination, the majority of
jurisdictions have viewed congressional intent broadly and found
that such intent explicitly required a preemptive effect. 2 Like-
wise, it has been noted that the presence of the savings and
deemer clauses would have been unnecessary had Congress in-
tended for the preemption clause to be narrowly construed.'
In applying this first prong, courts have consistently suggested
employee benefit plans, so dubbed or under any other name, be free of state regulation."
Barnes, 425 F. Supp. at 1300. See Lanam, supra note 26, at 315 (exceptions to preemption
are limited in that employee benefit plans may not be "deemed" insurance plans for pur-
poses of state regulation); Turza & Halloway, supra note 3, at 187 n.136. "In determining
whether a particular state statute is preempted, the courts have generally avoided the ques-
tion of whether a state statute regulates insurance. Instead they have focused on whether a
plan is an employee benefit plan which is free of state regulation." Id.
s9 471 U.S. 724 (1985). In Metropolitan Life, the United States Supreme Court advanced
a three-part test. Id. See also infra notes 40-65 and accompanying text (sets forth the Metro-
politan Life standard).
Many legal scholars have written on the preemption clause of ERISA and the applicable
test. See, e.g., Gregory, supra note 3, at 450 n.71. See also Note, Defining the Contours of
ERISA Preemption of State Insurance Regulation: Making Employee Benefit Plan Regulation An
Exclusively Federal Concern, 42 VAND. L. REV. 607, 622-29 (1989) (discusses Metropolitan Life
and Pilot Life cases).
40 See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739; see also supra notes 11 and 13 (courts deter-
mined whether various laws "related to" employee benefit plans). See generally Note, ERISA
Preemption of State Law: The Meaning of "Relate To" in Section 514, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 143
(1980) (discussing theoretical framework of preemption clauses in general).
" See, e.g., Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. 724 passim (1985).
42 See, e.g., Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739. The Metropolitan Life Court recognized the
"broad scope of the preemption clause." Id. (construing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines 463 U.S.
85, 95 (1983)). See Helms v. Monsanto Co., Inc., 728 F.2d 1416, 1419-20 (1 1th Cir. 1984).
"' See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98 (1982).
[C]ongress used the words "relate to" in § 514(a) in their broad sense. To interpret
§ 514(a) to preempt only state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit
plans would be to ignore the remainder of § 514. It would have been unnecessary to
exempt generally applicable state criminal statutes from preemption in § 514(b), for
example, if § 514(a) applied only to state laws dealing specifically with ERISA plans.
Id. See also Northern Group Servs., Inc. v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 85, 89 (6th Cir.
1987) (asserting that " 'savings' clause would not be necessary at all if it only saves state
laws that do not 'relate to' ERISA plans.").
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that a law "relates to" an employee benefit plan "if it has a con-
nection with or reference to such a plan.""" As a caveat, however,
some state actions may affect employee benefit plans too remotely
to warrant a finding that the state law "relates to" the plan." As a
result, while the preemption clause is generally interpreted
broadly, courts retain some limited discretion in their decision
making.4
Upon determining that a state law does relate to employee ben-
efit programs, a court would then proceed to evaluate whether or
not the state law "regulates insurance" within the meaning of the
savings clause exception contained in section 514. 7 In recognition
of the federal policy articulated in the McCarran-Ferguson Act4"
of providing the states with exclusive regulatory control over in-
surance,49 those laws that are specifically directed toward the in-
" Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1984).
The meaning to be given to the preemption clause, and in particular the "relates to"
language contained therein, is determinative of the scope of the clause itself. See Note,
supra note 39, at 616. A narrow interpretation would serve to preempt only those state
laws that directly impinge upon a traditional area of ERISA, i.e. disclosure, reporting or
fiduciary duties. Id. at 615. In contrast, a broad and sweeping construction would serve to
preempt virtually all state regulation of ERISA employee benefit plans. See Hewlett-Pack-
ard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1297-98 (N.D. Cal.) (broad interpretation of pre-
emption clause based on legislative history), aff'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 831 (1978). See generally Note, Regulation of Employee Welfare Benefit Plans: The
Scope of ERISA's Preemption and the State Power to Regulate Insurance, 4 U. DAYTON L. REV.
177, 185-93 (1979) (conflicting interpretations of preemption clause).
4' FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 885 F.2d 79, 85 (3d Cir. 1989) ("some state actions may affect
employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a find-
ing that the law 'relates to' the plan.") (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21 (1982)).
" See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text. While generally interpreted broadly,
the preemption provision may be construed to exempt from preemption state regulation
too remotely related to ERISA. Id. As such, an inference of limited judicial discretion is
warranted. Id.
" See supra notes 33 and 34 and accompanying text (setting forth statutory language of
"savings clause").
48 Pub. L. No. 78-238, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1982)). This
statute asserts that "[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or super-
sede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance.
unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance." 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (b).
Scholarly articles on the McCarran-Ferguson Act are numerous. See, e.g., Anderson, In-
surance and Antitrust Law: The McCarran-Ferguson Act and Beyond, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV.
81 (1983); Kennedy, The McCarran Act: A Limited "Business of Insurance" Antitrust Exemption
Made Even Narrower - Three Recent Decisions, 18 FORUM 528 (1983).
48 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1982 & Supp. 1988). "The business of insurance, and every per-
son engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the
regulation ... of such business." Id. See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co.,
440 U.S. 205 passim (1979) (McCarran-Ferguson Act to be broadly interpreted). See gener-
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surance industry are exempt from ERISA preemption."0
In Metropolitan Life, the United States Supreme Court enunci-
ated a three-prong subtest," pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, to determine whether a state law regulates insurance."2 The
court should analyze: (1) whether the state law has the effect of
transferring or spreading the policyholder's risk;5" (2) whether the
state law is an integral part of the relationship between the in-
surer and insured; 4 and (3) whether the state law is limited to
entities within the insurance industry."' If the court concludes
ally Comment, Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co.: The McCarran-Ferguson Act
and Health Service Plans, 5 Am. J.L. & MED. 393 (1980) (discussing ramifications of Group
L fe).
"0 See Note, supra note 39, at 620. "The insurance savings clause, drafted in order that
ERISA be consistent with the McCarran-Ferguson Act, reasserted that state governments,
and not the federal government, would be primarily responsible for the regulation of in-
surance and insurance companies." Id.; supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (relation-
ship between McCarran-Ferguson Act and the ERISA preemption provision).
61 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 passim (1985).
62 See id. at 743. The Metropolitan Life Court noted that those cases which have inter-
preted the breadth of the McCarran-Ferguson Act have demarcated three relevant factors
in determining whether a state law regulates insurance. Id. These factors are 'first,
whether the practice [law] has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk;
second whether the practice [law] is an integral part of the policy relationship between the
insurer and the insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the
insurance industry." Id. (emphasis in original). See also Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno,
458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982) (applying same three factors); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v.
Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979) (establishing these three relevant criteria as
test).
Numerous courts have applied this three-pronged McCarran-Ferguson Act subtest in de-
termining whether the state law regulates insurance, not merely in a general sense, but
rather within the meaning of the savings clause in particular. See, e.g., cases cited supra note
9 (all examining breadth of preemption clause). See generally Note, supra note 39, at 620
(discussing application of McCarran-Ferguson Act).
53 See supra note 52 (discussing scheme of McCarran-Ferguson subtest).
The origin of the first prong evolves from the primary elements of an insurance con-
tract: underwriting and spreading the policyholder's risk. See G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA Or IN-
SURANCE LAW § 1:3 (2d ed. 1984). "It is characteristic of insurance that a number of risks
are accepted, some of which involve losses, and that such losses are spread over all the risks
so as to enable the insurer to accept each risk at a slight fraction of the possible liability
upon it." Id. See also R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 1.2(a) (1971) (insurance is
an arrangement for transferring or spreading risk).
" See supra note 52 (discussing scheme of McCarran-Ferguson subtest).
The origin of the second prong of the subtest stems from another common aspect of the
"business of insurance" wherein the relationship of the insurer and insured is essential. See
Group Life, 440 U.S. at 215. In discussing the intent of Congress in passing the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, the Supreme Court has noted that "whatever the exact scope of the statu-
tory term, it is clear where the focus was - it was on the relationship between the insurance
company and the policyholder." SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969).
" See supra note 52 (discussing scheme of McCarran-Ferguson subtest).
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that any of these subprongs have not been satisfied, then the state
law will fail the second part of the preemption inquiry and will not
escape preemption via the savings clause. 6
In the event that the court determines that the state law does
regulate insurance within the meaning of the savings clause, then
the third and final prong of the Metropolitan Life test must be ap-
plied.5 7 Under this part of the test, the court must determine
whether the employee benefit plan in dispute is deemed an insur-
ance fund.5 8 This is when the deemer clause, upon which the final
prong is based, may effectuate the congressional effort to prevent
a state from labeling any ERISA plan as insurance so that it will
be subject to state regulation.59
While agreeing as to the purpose of the deemer clause,60 courts
have differed in its application.61 In Metropolitan Life, the Supreme
The origin of the final prong of the subtest evolves from the holding in Group Life where
the Court interpreted the McCarran-Ferguson Act as not including "entities outside the
insurance industry." Group Life 440 U.S. at 224.
" See, e.g., Baxter v. Lynn, 886 F.2d 182, 186 (8th Cir. 1989). In Baxter, the court deter-
mined that the subrogation law at issue did not transfer the risk from the policyholder to
the insurer, nor did the court feel that the state law was limited to the insurance industry.
Id. Accordingly, the court held that the state subrogation law was preempted by ERISA.
Id. See also infra notes 86-98 and accompanying text (providing detailed examination of
Baxter).
"' See supra note 35 and accompanying text (setting forth statutory language of deemer
clause).
Id. Prior to the enactment of ERISA, employers who established employee benefit
plans were subject to the same state insurance regulations as were insurance companies. See
Note, supra note 39, at 633. That is, states were able to regulate self-funded employee
benefit plans under the premise that "the plans were underwriting the spreading of em-
ployee risk" and thus were subject to state insurance regulation. Id. at 633 n.160.
"' See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 885 F.2d 79, 86 (3d Cir. 1989). The court in Holliday
suggested that "the deemer clause is meant mainly to reach back-door attempts by states to
regulate core ERISA concerns in the guise of insurance regulation." Id.; Northern Group
Servs., Inc. v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1017 (1988). See also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987). But see Brum-
mond, Federal Preemption of State Insurance Regulation Under ERISA, 62 IowA L. REv. 57, 98-
99 (1976). It is suggested that self-funded plans satisfy the elements of an insurance agree-
ment as established by the McCarran-Ferguson Act and as a result should not be affected
by the deemer clause. Id.
0 See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of implementation of
deemer clause). See also supra note 35 (laying out statutory language of deemer clause,
which serves to prevent a state from wrongfully declaring an employee benefit plan to be
insurer within meaning of savings clause). See generally Note, ERISA and the Preemption of
State Law, 6 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 599 (1978) (discussing statutory scheme of ERISA's pre-
emption provision).
"1 See, e.g., Baxter v. Lynn, 886 F.2d 182, 186 (8th Cir. 1989) (dicta asserting deemer
clause prevented application of savings clause to state subrogation law); Holliday, 885 F.2d
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Court articulated a standard using the deemer clause to distin-
guish solely between employee benefit plans that are insured by
outside sources and those which are self-funded. 62 Plans which
purchase insurance are subject to state regulation regardless of
the deemer clause, while self-funded plans are exempt from the
savings clause through the deemer clause and regulated only by
federal law."' Yet, despite this clearly articulated standard, various
courts have chosen to implement a different application which
purports to grant greater deference to congressional intent.6"
This approach applies the deemer clause only where the state law
is deemed to be an attempt by the state to impinge upon ERISA
in such exclusively federal areas as reporting, disclosure and
nonforfeitability."'
III. RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS CONSIDERING ERISA PREEMPTION
OF STATE ANTISUBROGATION LAWS
A. Origin and Nature of Subrogation
The principle of subrogation is an equitable one,"6 independent
at 90 (with respect to state subrogation laws, "the savings clause applies while the deemer
clause does not").
In addition, numerous state laws have been held to fall under the savings clause despite
the presence of the deemer clause. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts,
471 U.S. 724, 758 (1985) (state-mandated benefit law not preempted by ERISA); Wad-
sworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 78 (1st Cir. 1977) (concluding that ERISA does not pre-
empt application of state insurance regulations to independently insured employee benefit
plans), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978).
" Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 747. The Supreme Court recognized that their "decision
results in a distinction between insured and uninsured plans, leaving the former open to
indirect regulation while the latter are not." Id.
" Id. See also Baxter, 886 F.2d at 186. Here, the court suggests that if the employee
benefit plan purchased insurance independently, then a subrogation clause in the insurance
contract could be subject to state insurance regulation. Id. However, where the fund is
completely self-insured, it is not subject to state regulation. Id.
" See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 885 F.2d 79, 86-90 (3d Cir. 1989). Here, the court relies
on legislative history to conclude that "Congress intended the deemer clause to protect
core ERISA concerns within the context of the insurance regulation exception to preemp-
tion." Id. at 88. The court rejects the language of the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Life,
instead suggesting that the deemer clause was meant to protect ERISA plans from being
deemed an insurer by regulation that was merely a pretext for impinging on ERISA em-
ployee benefit plans. Id. at 86-87.
"6 Holliday, 885 F.2d at 88. "[Tihe deemer clause guards against any insurance regula-
tion that infringes on such ERISA areas as reporting, disclosure and nonforfeitability." Id.
" Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Meyer, 301 Ky. 487, 491, 192 S.W.2d 388, 390
(1946)("[Tjhe principle of subrogation is a principle of equity. ... ); 6A J. APPLEMAN,
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of statutory law67 and similar in nature to the equitable principles
of restitution and unjust enrichment.6 8 Fundamentally, subroga-
tion is the substitution of an individual in the place of a creditor
so that the individual who is substituted succeeds to the rights of
the other in relation to the debt or claim."9 Since the concept of
subrogation rests on principles of equity, its object is to promote
justice while simultaneously preventing injustice.70
A subrogation issue most frequently arises when an insurer in-
demnifies an insured pursuant to an insurance agreement.71 The
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 4093 at 253 (1967) (Subrogation is "founded . . . upon
equitable principles."); Comment, Denial of Subrogation Rights-A Question for the Court or
the Legislature?: Weinberg v. Dinger, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 99, 99-100 (1987) ("The doc-
trine of subrogation originated in equity."); Comment, No Fault Insurance-Subrogation in
Underinsured Motorist Settlement Proceedings-Schmidt v. Clothier, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
585, 589 (1985) ("concept of subrogation is based in equity"). See Fidelity & Casualty Co.
of New York v. First Nat'l Bank of Fort Lee, 397 F. Supp. 587, 589 (D.N.J. 1975) ("[11t is
only equitable that the insurer should be reimbursed for his payment to the insured.");
Northern Trust Co. v. Consolidated Elevator Co., 142 Minn. 132, 138, 171 N.W. 265, 268
(1919) ("The object of subrogation is to place the charge where it ought to rest by compel-
ling payment of the debt by him who ought in equity to pay it."); see also Stafford Metal
Works, Inc. v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 418 F. Supp. 56, 58 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (states
"three equitable reasons traditionally advanced for permitting subrogation .... ).
s7 See Ex rel Nelson v. Phillip State Bank & Trust Co., 307 I1. App. 464, 463, 30 N.E.2d
771, 773 (1940) ("subrogation originated in equity"); Burks v. Packer, 143 Neb. 373, 374,
9 N.W.2d 471, 473 (1943) (doctrine of subrogation "did not originate in statute or custom
but was invented by equity courts to do complete justice."); see also Western Casualty &
Sur. Co. v. Meyer, 301 Ky. 487, 492, 192 S.W.2d 388, 391 (1946) ("[T]he law of subroga-
tion is as settled as it is universal.").
" Western Casualty, 301 Ky. at 491, 192 S.W.2d at 390; 83 C.J.S. Subrogation § 2(a) at 581
(1955); see also supra note 66.
ss BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1279 (5th ed. 1979); 83 C.J.S. Subrogation § 1 at 575 (1955).
" See Berdie v. Kurtz, 88 F.2d 158, 159-60 (9th Cir. 1937) (compelling justice and af-
fording adequate remedy is objective of equity); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Petro-
leum Nay. Co., 35 F. Supp. 350, 351 (W.D. Wash. 1940) (subrogation should prevent injus-
tice); see also Home Owners Loan Corp. v. Baker, 299 Mass. 158, 159, 12 N.E.2d 199, 201
(1937). "Subrogation is the substitution of one person in place of another . . . so that he
who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to the debt or claim." Id.
(quoting Jackson Co. v. Boyleston Mut. Ins. Co., 139 Mass. 508, 510, 2 N.E. 103, 104
(1885)).
"' See Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 115 F.2d 277, 280-81
(4th Cir. 1940), (doctrine of subrogation is applied in context of insurance case), cert. de-
nied, 312 U.S. 702 (1941); Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. First Nat. Bank of Fort
Lee, 397 F. Supp. 587, 589 (D.N.J. 1975) (same); Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Pelleckhia,
15 N.J. 162, 179-80, 104 A.2d 288, 297 (1954) (same).
There are two types of subrogation-conventional and legal. Legal subrogation arises by
operation of law, whereas conventional subrogation arises through a contract between the
parties. See Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Texas v. Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co., 408 F.
2d 776, 778 (5th Cir. 1969); Jorski Mill & Elevator Co. v. Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co.,
404 F.2d 143, 147 (10th Cir. 1968); Pub. Serv. Co. v. Black & Veach, 328 F. Supp. 14, 16
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insurer is then subrogated to any rights that the insured may have
had against a third party."
Because subrogation rights originate by operation of law,7"
there is no need for an insurance contract to expressly state that
such rights exist. 7' In fact, if the parties wish to modify or elimi-
nate subrogation rights they must expressly state this intention in
the insurance agreement. 5
Most recently, pursuant to the enactment of the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act which effectively granted to the states full regulatory
authority over insurance, 6 the subrogation doctrine has been stat-
utorily defined by many states.7 Some state legislatures have
(N.D. Okla. 1971); In re Lauer, 38 F. Supp. 691, 696 (D.N.J. 1941).
" See generally Brown & Goode, Conflicts of Interest in Subrogation Actions, 22 TORT & INS.
L. J. 16, 21 (1986); Comment, Denial of Subrogation Rights - A Question for the Court or the
Legislature?: Weinberg v. Dinger, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 99, 99-100 (1987) (insurer steps
"into the shoes of its insured in order to recover from a culpable third party"). See, e.g.,
Turner Constr. Co. v. John B. Kelly Co., 442 F. Supp. 551, 553 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (insurance
carrier, as subrogee of construction company, granted all rights against negligent
subcontractor).
7' See Turner Constr., 442 F. Supp. at 552; Brown & Goode, supra note 72, at 21.
See City Stores Co. v. Lerner Shops of D.C., Inc., 410 F.2d 1010, 1011 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (right of subrogation is "independent of any contractual relations between the par-
ties" (quoting Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132 n.12 (1962))). "[lit is generally
recognized . . . that the insurer is subrogated to claims of its insured against others . . . if
neither the insurance contract nor the agreement made in settling the claim under the
insurance policy contains any reference to subrogation .... " R. KEETON, supra note 53, at
147. See also supra note 73 (discussing origination of subrogation as being by operation of
law).
" 83 C.J.S. Subrogation § 3(b) at 585 (1955). "A right of true legal subrogation may be
provided for in a contract, but the exercise of the right will, nevertheless, have its basis in
general principles of equity rather than in the contract, which will be treated as merely a
declaration of principles of law already existing." Id. "[T]he insurer may waive all or part
of its subrogation rights by stipulation in the policy or by other means." R. KEETON, supra
note 53, at 147.
'6 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976).
Section 2 of the McCarran-Ferguson Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) State Regulation. The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein,
shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or
taxation of such business.
(b) Federal Regulation. No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair,
or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business
of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance . ...
15 U.S.C. § 1012. (1945).
" See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118(f) (1985) ("Insurers providing benefits .
shall be subrogated to the rights ... of the person for whom the benefits are provided ...
."); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, para. 375 (Smith-Hurd 1981) (requiring subrogation of insurers
of financial institutions to rights of depositors); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17.36.5.20 (West 1985)
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passed laws in areas where they have deemed subrogation rights
to be inappropriate."' This has resulted in a conflict between
these ntisubrogation laws and an individual's equitable right to
subrogation ."
B. Recent Case Law
Courts have been struggling with the question of whether state
antisubrogation laws are preempted by section 514 of ERISA.
Two circuits addressed this issue in September of 1989 and
reached different conclusions."0
In Baxter v. Lynn,81 the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit
held that ERISA preempts state restrictions on subrogation with
("[The] Company may require from the insured an assignment of all right of recovery
against any party for loss to the extent that payment therefor is made by this Company.").
See generally Comment, supra note 66, at 101, 109. "In standard insurance policies, statu-
tory approval or denial of the insertion of a subrogation provision determines an insurance
carrier's right to subrogation." Id. at 109.
The laws of different jurisdictions may be summarized in five different rules. R. KEETON,
supra note 53, at 160. First, "[t]he insurer is the sole beneficial owner of the claim against
the third party and is entitled to the full amount recovered, whether or not it exceeds the
amount paid by the insurer ..... Id. at 160-61. Second, "[t]he insurer is to be reimbursed
first out of the recovery from the third party, and the insured is entitled to any remaining
balance." Id. at 161. Third, "[t]he recovery from the third person is to be prorated be-
tween the insurer and the insured in accordance with the percentage of the original loss
for which the insurer paid the insured under the policy." Id. Fourth, "[ojut of the recovery
from the third party, the insured is to be reimbursed first, for the loss not covered by
insurance, and the insurer is entitled to any remaining balance, up to a sum sufficient to
reimburse the insurer fully, the insured being entitled to anything beyond that." Id. Fifth,
"[t]he insured is the sole owner of the claim against the third party and is entitled to the
full amount recovered, whether or not the total thus received ... exceeds his loss." Id. at
162. The fourth rule has the greatest precedential support. Id. at 164.
78 See R. KEETON, supra note 53, at 149-50. In addition, "[a] few [courts] have struck ...
down [subrogation clauses in automobile medical payment coverages] . . . on the theory
that they violate rules against the assignability of causes of action for injury to person." Id.
See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418, 424 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965)(subrogation clause held invalid as prohibited assignment of cause of action arising out of
personal injury); Peller v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 610, 34 Cal. Rptr.
41 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (subrogation clause similarly held invalid).
"In relation to life and accident insurance, it is generally recognized that the insurer is
not subrogated to claims of its insured ... in the absence of contract stipulations so provid-
ing." KEETON, supra note 53, at 149.
" See supra notes 66-78 (discussing policies and objectives of subrogation, and state regu-
lation of subrogation law).
8" Compare Baxter v. Lynn, 886 F.2d 182, 186 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that ERISA does
preempt state antisubrogation laws) with FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 885 F.2d 79, 90 (3d Cir.
1989) (holding that ERISA does not preempt antisubrogation laws).
"' 886 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1989).
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respect to self-funded employee benefit plans."2 Less than two
weeks earlier, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in
FMC Corp. v. Holliday8 that a Pennsylvania antisubrogation stat-
ute was not preempted."' Although the holdings of these cases
conflict, both courts applied the same preemption test as outlined
in Part II of this Note."'
1. Baxter v. Lynn
In Baxter, an employee benefit plan covered injuries incurred by
the son of an employee in an automobile accident.8 6 The plan
paid medicai expenses totaling $23,305 on behalf of the child."
The Baxters then filed suit against the driver of the other vehicle
involved in the collision. 8 The trustee of the employee benefit
plan sought a declaratory judgment on the issue of whether the
plan had a subrogation right for money recovered by the Baxters
in their negligence action against the other driver.8 9 The Baxters
claimed that state precedent had prohibited subrogation in motor
vehicle accident actions.9 The plan asserted that ERISA preempts
any state law which operates to regulate ERISA benefit plans,91 in
which case the plan would be the sole party entitled to bring suit
against the other driver and the Baxter's suit would be precluded.
Before applying the preemption test set forth in Part II of this
Note, the Baxter Court noted that section 514 of ERISA is "delib-
erately expansive, and it is designed to establish pension plan reg-
ulation as exclusively a federal concern."' 2 The court then pro-
ceeded to apply the three-prong preemption test promulgated by
62 Id. at 186.
63 885 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1989).
Id. at 90.
See supra notes 40-65 and accompanying text (stating appropriate applicability test of
ERISA section 514).
"' Baxter v. Lynn, 886 F.2d 182, 184 (8th Cir. 1989).
81 Id.
" Id.
89 Id.
" Id. at 185. The Baxters argued that subrogation is inappropriate since there is a con-
tractual obligation, independent of the insurer's obligation to pay for the medical expenses
arising from the accident. Id.
" Baxter v. Lynn, 886 F.2d 182, 184 (8th Cir. 1989).
92 Id. at 185.
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 5: 29, 1989
the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Life. 93 Initially determining
that the state antisubrogation law "related to" employee benefit
plans, " the court then utilized the McCarran-Ferguson subtest to
determine if the state law "regulated insurance" within the mean-
ing of ERISA's savings clause.9 The Baxter court determined that
the state law did not regulate insurance, finding that the antisub-
rogation law neither transferred or spread the risk of the Baxters
nor was limited solely to entities within the insurance industry.96
As such, two of the three prongs of the McCarran-Ferguson sub-
test were not met by this particular state regulation, thus remov-
ing the law from the protection from preemption offered by the
savings clause.97 Finally, though not necessary, the Baxter court
proceeded to the third prong of the Metropolitan Life test and as-
serted that even if the state law had survived the savings clause, it
still would have been preempted since the deemer clause prevents
the application of the savings clause to self-funded employee bene-
fit plans.98
2. FMC Corp. v. Holliday
In Holliday, the respondent was injured in an automobile acci-
" 471 U.S. 724 (1985). The elements of the test set forth in Metropolitan Life are: (1)
whether the state law "relates to" employee benefit plans; (2) whether the state law regu-
lates insurance; (3) whether the employee benefit plan is an insurance plan or is just
deemed to be an insurance plan for purposes of state regulation. Id. at 739-47. See also
Note, supra note 39, at 622-26 (discussing elements of preemption test and their applica-
tion in Metropolitan Life); supra notes 39-40, 47, 51-55, 58 and accompanying text (describ-
ing test of applicability of Section 514, incorporating the Metropolitan Life standard).
" Baxter v. Lynn, 886 F.2d 182, 185 (8th Cir. 1989). The court stated that a law "re-
lates to" an employee benefit plan if it "has a connection with or reference to" an em-
ployee benefit plan. Id. (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983)). In
Baxter, the court of appeals agreed with the district court's finding that any state law which
attempted to limit the Fund's subrogation rights has a connection with the employee bene-
fit plan and thus "relates to" the plan. Id.
'4 Baxter v. Lynn, 886 F.2d 182, 185-86 (8th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 186. In addition, the court stated that "the law of subrogation, while generally
applicable to insurance contracts, is not specifically directed toward the insurance indus-
try." Id. Furthermore, the "[alpplication of differing state subrogation laws to plan provid-
ers throughout the United States would frustrate ERISA's uniform treatment of benefit
plans." Id.
Id.
" Baxter v. Lynn, 886 F.2d 182, 185-86 (8th Cir. 1989). Basing this decision on dicta
from Metropolitan Life, the court found that if the fund had purchased insurance from an
independent company, it would have been subject to state insurance regulations. Id. Since
it was self-insured, the fund could not be subject to even indirect state regulation. Id.
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dent9" sustaining injuries which were covered by her father's em-
ployee benefit plan. 00 The employer, FMC Corporation, sought a
declaratory judgment entitling it to subrogation of Holliday's
right to recover for personal injuries incurred in the accident.10
Holliday claimed that Pennsylvania law expressly prohibited such
subrogation.0 2 FMC asserted that the state law was preempted by
ERISA. 103
The Holliday court, like the court in Baxter, utilized the three-
prong test of Metropolitan Life.'" The court found that the statute
satisfied the first prong of the test since it "related to" an em-
ployee benefit plan, as "[a] law relates to an employee benefit
plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with
or reference to such a plan."10 5 Proceeding to the next prong, the
court found that the state antisubrogation law met the require-
ments of the McCarran-Ferguson test, and thus "regulated insur-
ance" within the meaning of the savings clause.0 6 The court then
applied the third prong of the test which examines whether the
employee benefit plan is "deemed" an insurance fund.107 In em-
ploying this part of the test, the Holliday court expressly rejected
the distinction between self-funded plans and those plans funded
by independent insurance companies set forth in Metropolitan
Life.'0 8 Instead, the court interpreted the deemer clause narrowly,
holding that the Pennsylvania law regulated a legitimate state con-
" FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 885 F.2d 79, 80 (3d Cir. 1989).
100 Id.
101 Id. at 81.
102 Id. The Pennsylvania antisubrogation law provides in pertinent part that "[in actions
arising out of the . . . use of a motor vehicle, there shall be no right of subrogation . . .
from a claimant's tort recovery ... or benefits in lieu thereof paid or payable under section
1719 (relation to coordination of benefits)." 75 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1720 (Purdon 1988).
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 885 F.2d 79, 81 (3d Cir. 1989).
104 Id. at 84-90. See supra note 93 (detailing Metropolitan Life test).
'05 FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 885 F.2d 79, 84 (3d Cir. 1989). (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983)).
" Id. at 85-86. The court found that the Pennsylvania "statute's coordination of bene-
fits and antisubrogation provisions directly control[led] the terms of insurance contracts"
and was, therefore, saved from preemption by the savings clause. Id. at 86.
107 Id. at 86-90.
"08 Id. at 89. Furthermore, the court rejected the findings of the ERISA oversight re-
port, infra note 120, claiming that it "conflicts with a reasonable interpretation of statutory
text and legislative history." Holliday, 885 F.2d at 88 n.5 (quoting Northern Group Servs.
v. Auto Owners Ins., 833 F.2d 85, 92 (6th Cir. 1985)).
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cern and did not apply to any area which ERISA intended to re-
serve solely for federal regulation." 9 Thus, the court concluded
that tie deemer clause did not serve to remove the antisubroga-
tion law from the scope of the savings clause, and the law was
therefore not preempted by section 514.11
IV. THE BROAD INTERPRETATION OF Baxter: THE RIGHT CHOICE
The Holliday and Baxter holdings illustrate the breadth of the
preemptive scope of ERISA, exemplifying two diametrically op-
posed viewpoints on the spectrum of preemptive prerogative uti-
lized by the judiciary. It is submitted that a simple balancing of
congressional intent and public policy necessitates a finding that
state antisubrogation laws are preempted by ERISA.
A. The Breadth of Preemption: Congressional Intent
With the enactment of the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure
Act of 1958 (WPPDA),"' Congress preserved state authority to
regulate employee benfit plans."1 2 ERISA repealed the WPPDA"a
by creating a uniform scheme of regulation of employee benefit
plans with sole power reserved to the federal government." 4 This
'" FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 885 F.2d 79, 88 93d Cir. 1989). The court reads the deemer
clause narrowly, stating that it guards only "against any insurance regulation that infringes
on such ERISA areas as reporting, disclosure and nonforfeitability." Id. The court goes on
to say that "[any reading [of the deemer clause] other than one confined to the central
aspects of ERISA would either have the deemer clause swallow the savings clause or read
into the statute other distinctions that are not there." Id.
110 Id. at 90.
1.. Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act of 1958 (hereinafter WPPDA), Pub. L. No.
85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958) (repealed 1974).
"' See 29 U.S.C. § 309 (1970) (repealed 1974). See also Malone v. White Motor Corp.,
435 U.S. 497, 505 (1978) ("[the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act] together with
the legislative history of the 1958 Disclosure Act, clearly indicate that Congress at that
time recognized and preserved state authority to regulate pension plans .... "); S. REP.
No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 4137
(detailing legislative history of the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act of 1958).
'3' 29 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(1) (1985). "The Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act . . . is
repealed . I..." Id. For a general discussion of the act, see Note, The Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act - Its History, Operation, and Amendment, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 682, 690-
92 (1962) (discussing problems associated with WPPDA).
... See supra notes 7 and 25 and accompanying text (suggesting that primary objective of
Congress in enacting ERISA was to formulate strict uniformity in laws regulating employee
benefit plans). See also Comment, Regulation of Employee Welfare Benefit Plans: The Scope of
ERISA's Preemption and The State Power to Regulate Insurance, 4 U. DAYTON L. REV. 177, 181
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uniformity was to be achieved through the enactment of the sec-
tion 514 preemption clause. 15 However, the Baxter and Holliday
decisions illustrate that judicial interpretation of the breadth of
this scope has been far from uniform." 6
A review of the legislative history of ERISA indicates quite
clearly that Congress intended to create "a body of Federal sub-
stantive law ... to deal with issues involving rights and obligations
under private welfare and pension plans. 1 17 In light of this goal,
the sponsors of ERISA indicated that section 514 was created to
impose a broad sweep of state law regulating employee benefit
plans. s Congressman John Dent, Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Labor of the House Labor and Education Committee and
Floor Manager for ERISA in the House of Representatives, while
speaking of ERISA's preemption clause stated:
(1979) "Through ERISA, Congress intended to establish a single, uniform regulatory
scheme for employee benefit plans." Id.
The Welfare Pension Plan Disclosure Act proved to be woefully inadequate. See Com-
ment, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: Policies and Problems, 26 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 539 passim (1974). One objective of the WPPDA was to enable employee plan par-
ticipants to police their own plans by obtaining plan descriptions and financial data from
the Secretary of Labor. Id. at 553-54. However, the complexity of the plans themselves
rendered this goal virtually impossible. See HousE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR,
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT SECURITY ACT OF 1973, H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, re-
printed in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4646. To remedy this, ERISA pro-
vides that a plan description is to be "written in a manner calculated to be understood by
the average plan participant." 29 U.S.C § 1022 (a)(1) (1982).
... See supra notes 7-9 and 25 and accompanying text (discussing uniformity goal of Con-
gress in enacting section 514). For a description of the statutory scheme of the ERISA
preemption clause, see supra notes 25-38 and accompanying text.
11 See supra note 11. The recent split in the circuits is a prime example of this unsuc-
cessful uniform interpretation. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (noting contrary
decisions reached by Baxter and Holliday courts).
"' 120 CONG. REC. 29942 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits). See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cali-
fornia v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust For S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26 (1983).
The statute states that "the district courts of the United States shall have exclusive juris-
diction of civil actions under this subchapter brought by the Secretary or by a participant,
beneficiary or fiduciary." 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (e)(1) (1980). This exclusive jurisdiction does
not include "actions by a participant or beneficiary to recover benefits due, to enforce
rights under the terms of a plan, or to clarify rights to future benefits, over which state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction." Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 463 U.S. at 24 n.26.
.1. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974) (Sen. Jacob Javits, ranking minority member
of Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, suggesting that the enacted legislation
is to have a broad preemptive scope); 120 CONG. REC. 29,933 (1974) (Sen. Harrison Wil-
liams, Chairman of Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, suggested that section
514 "is intended to apply in its broadest sense to all actions of State or local governments.
• .."). See generally Gregory, supra note 3, at 454-55 (discussing legislative intent of section
514).
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I wish to make note of what is to many the crowning achieve-
ment of this legislation, the reservation to Federal authority
the sole power to regulate the field of employee benefit plans
... . [We], with the narrow exceptions specifically enumer-
ated, applied this principle in its broadest sense to foreclose
any non-Federal regulation of employee benefit plans." 9
While this contemporaneous legislative history is strong evi-
dence of congressional intent for a broad preemptive interpreta-
tion, subsequent post-enactment findings are similarly supportive.
The Joint Pension Task Force, reporting its conclusions based on
studies conducted during the two years following the enactment
of ERISA, stated that "the legislative scheme of ERISA is suffi-
ciently broad to leave no room for effective state regulation within
the preempted field. Similarly it is our finding that the Federal
interest and the need for national uniformity are so great that en-
forcement of state regulation should be precluded." 120 Clearly the
congressional intent was to provide for sole regulation of the
field. 2' Moreover, the manner in which this intent was meant to
manifest itself is equally clear: federal preemption in the broadest
sense.
12 2
B. The Breadth of Preemption: Supreme Court Interpretations
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has enter-
tained five ERISA preemption cases.123 The underlying disputes
are largely the result of the Reagan Administration's policy of def-
erence to state regulation,124 coupled with the rapid growth of
"1 120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974).
120 ACTIVITY REPORT OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, H.R. REP. No.
1785, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977) (quoted in 6 FOROHAM URB. L.J. 599, 611-12 (1978)). The
Joint Pension Task Force was specifically created to study the effects of ERISA § 514. See
29 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1222 (1985).
121 See id.
122 See id.
122 See infra notes 126-146 and accompanying text. From the year ERISA was imple-
mented (1974) to the present, the Supreme Court has heard five ERISA preemption cases.
Id. All of those cases were heard between 1981 and 1988, with the last three being decided
between 1985 and 1988. Id.
124 See Gregory, supra note 3, at 430 n.3. Professor Gregory, in his discussion on ERISA
preemption and federalism, alludes to the political ideology of the Reagan Administration
as exemplifying deference to state regulation. Id. Professor Gregory also cites numerous
other works of legal scholars discussing the role of federalism in the Reagan Administra-
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employment benefit plans in the 1980s.125
Of the five ERISA preemption cases heard by the Supreme
Court,"2 6 the earliest three were decided by the Burger Court.12 7
Despite this Court's historic deference afforded state regula-
tion, 28 a broad interpretation of the ERISA preemption provision
permeates these three opinions." 9
In the first of these cases, Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,13
the Court was reluctant to provide a broad preemption ration-
ale. 3 Nonetheless, the Court found that the state law was indeed
preempted by section 514.32
In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,'" the second Burger Court deci-
tion. See, e.g., THE STATUS OF FEDERALISM IN AMERICA, A REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
FEDERALISM OF THE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL (1986) (effort by Administration to develop
strategy for ensuring that federal law and regulations are rooted in "basic constitutional
federalism principles"); Note, Judicial Examination of Deregulation: Exploring the Boundaries
of Executive Discretion, 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 86 (1984); Note, Separating Myth from Reality in
Federalism Decisions: A Perspective of American Federalism-Past and Present, 35 VAND. L. REV.
161 (1982).
See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 127-146 and accompanying text (discussing the five Supreme Court
holdings concerning ERISA preemption).
In addition, the Supreme Court has entertained numerous other ERISA cases, none
dealing with preemption. See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211
(1986) (dealing with obligations of employer in multiple employer pension fund); Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984) (discussing constitutionality
of federal multiple employer pension plan regulations), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984).
' See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 758 (1985) (state man-
dated-provider law not preempted by § 514); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,
108-09 (1983) (restricting preemption of certain state antidiscrimination laws); Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 526 (1981) (finding state law which served to
regulate employee benefit plans preempted by ERISA's preemption provision).
128 See Gregory, supra note 3, at 430 n.3. The Burger Court strengthened the power of
the states by cutting back on the power of the federal government over the states. Id.
Professor Gregory suggests the Burger Court "led the 'states' rights' assault on federalism
.... Id. See also Alessi, 451 U.S. at 522 (1981) (Burger Court acknowledged that
"[pireemption of state law by federal statute or regulation is not favored. ) (quoting
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963)).
"' See infra notes 130-139 and accompanying text (discussing Burger Court holdings on
ERISA preemption).
"' 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
1S. See id. at 522.
1.. See id. at 526 (Court held state statute was "preempted by federal law insofar as it
bears on pension plans governed by ERISA"). In Alessi, the state law in question impinged
upon employee benefit plans in an area traditionally governed by
ERISA-nonforfeitability. Id. at 510-11. The preemption provision of ERISA was held to
be triggered when the state regulation encroached upon an area of exclusive federal con-
cern. Id. at 525.
33 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
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sion interpreting the scope of ERISA's preemption section, the
Court expanded the Alessi holding, expressly rejecting prior inter-
pretations of section 514 which limited the preemptive scope to
only those state laws dealing with subject matters at the core of
ERISA such as funding, reporting and disclosure. 13  Despite the
breadth of the Shaw Court's decision, the determination as to
which state laws were not preempted became more difficult, as it
was no longer sufficient to merely discern whether the state law
regulated subject matter expressly covered by ERISA. 33
The Metropolitan Life decision, the final ERISA preemption case
heard by the Burger Court, 36 established a clear standard to de-
termine whether state law was preempted.3 7 Although the Court
found that the state law in dispute in Metropolitan Life was an in-
surance regulation and thus exempt from the preemption provi-
sion of ERISA, 38 it nonetheless reaffirmed the broad scope of the
preemption clause, as delineated in Shaw. 39
I Id. at 98. Relying on extensive legislative history to glean congressional intent, the
Court acknowledged that the preemptive scope of section 514 was as broad as its sweeping
language. Id.
Despite the clear language of section 514, prior to the Shaw decision, many courts held
that ERISA did not preempt state law. See, e.g., Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Dep't of Indus., Labor
& Human Relations of Wis., 599 F.2d 205, 213 (7th Cir. 1979) (Congress did not intend to
preempt state fair employment laws by enacting ERISA), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031
(1980); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. State, 289 N.W.2d 396, 400-01 (Minn. 1979)
(state anti-discrimination laws are not preempted), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1041 (1980);
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Comm'r of Labor & Indus., 187 Mont. 22, -, 608
P.2d 1047, 1050 (1979) (Montana Maternity Leave Act not preempted by ERISA), appeal
dismissed, 445 U.S. 921 (1980).
"I See Gregory, supra note 3, at 467. "After Shaw, it was no longer sufficient to ascertain
whether the state law intruded upon specific substantive fields regulated exclusively by
ERISA .... Obviously, the Shaw inquiry is much broader and more difficult .... " Id.
136 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 passim (1985).
'" See supra notes 52-65 and accompanying text (outlining three-prong test set forth by
Supreme Court in Metropolitan Life); Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 738-47. See generally
Note, supra note 39 (discussing Metropolitan Life case in detail).
"I Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 758. The Supreme Court upheld the Massachusetts
mandated-benefit law as an insurance regulation, and as such, "a valid and unexceptional
exercise of the Commonwealth's police power." Id. As an insurance regulation, it fell
within the scope of the savings clause. Id..at 746-47.
I" See id. at 739 (preemption provision "intended to displace all state laws that fall
within its sphere .... ") In Metropolitan Life, the Court noted that "Shaw held that ERISA's
broad pre-emption provision was intended to pre-empt any state law that 'relate[d] to' an
employee-benefit plan, not merely those state laws that directly conflicted with a substan-
tive provision" in ERISA. Id. at 737. See also supra notes 134-135 and accompanying text
(discussing Shaw decision in detail).
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In Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,140 the Rehnquist Court contin-
ued to apply the broad interpretation of section 514.141 In Pilot,
the Court observed that the "pre-emption provisions of ERISA
are deliberately expansive, and designed to 'establish pension plan
regulation as exclusively a federal concern.' "141 Referring to the
legislative history of ERISA, the Court noted that, contrary to the
limited preemption clause of the original bill, the Congressional
Conference Committee indicated that the preemptive scope of the
current law "was as broad as its language. 1 43
The most recent Supreme Court decision focusing on the
ERISA preemption provision is Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency
& Service, Inc. 14 In Mackey, the Court, in holding that a state anti-
garnishment statute which explicitly covered benefit plans subject
to ERISA was preempted by section 514,145 broadly interpreted
the preemption clause to find that the state law "related to" em-
ployee benefit plans. 46 It is submitted that the United States Su-
preme Court recognized the strong congressional intent behind
ERISA and has made its opinion clear: ERISA federal preemption
is to be broad and sweeping. It is further submitted that it is the
Eighth Circuit in Baxter that is most closely aligned with this
opinion.
140 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
See id. at 45-47. The Supreme Court observed that past decisions have recognized
that the provisions of section 514 are deliberately expansive and designed to grant full
control to the federal government. Id. at 46-47. Relying on its decisions in Shaw and Metro-
politan Life, as well as legislative history, the Court affirmed the broad sweep of the ERISA
preemption provision. Id. at 47.
... Id. at 45-46 (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981)).
... Id. at 46 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98 (1983)). The Court
went on to note that the preemption provision has been described as the "crowning
achievement" of ERISA. Id. (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (statement of Senator Wil-
liams) (1974)).
'44 486 U.S. 825 1988).
... Id. at 839. See also id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Joined by Justices Blackmun,
O'Connor and Scalia, Justice Kennedy asserted that the scope of ERISA's preemption pro-
vision, as shaped by prior cases, is broad enough to encompass a state's general garnish-
ment statute and not solely a state antigarnishment statute expressly designed to regulate
ERISA employee benefit plans. Id. at 842.
"'I Id. at 829. Here, the state antigarnishment statute was specifically designed to apply
solely to ERISA employee benefit plans. Id. As such, the Supreme Court reaffirmed prior
holdings "that state laws which make 'reference to' ERISA plans are laws that 'relate to'
those plans within the meaning of § 514(a)." Id.
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V. SUBROGATION: IMPERATIVE FOR THE VOLUNTARY CREATION OF
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS
Although ERISA is highly regulatory with respect to those em-
ployee benefit plans that are already in existence,147 it does not
mandate that an employer create such a plan. 4 Absent state
mandated-provider laws,149 the enactment of employee benefit
programs is entirely voluntary.'
Given the significant impact that employee benefit plans have
on the lives of most employees,"1 the continuance of these plans
is required to sustain the health, safety and welfare of the popu-
lace.' 52 It is submitted that the failure to preempt state antisubro-
gation laws will deter employers from establishing benefit
117 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing comprehensive nature of ERISA).
With very few exceptions, ERISA covers all existing employee benefit plans. See 29
U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1985). This provision suggests that ERISA applies to all employee benefit
plans other than those excluded within the statute. Id. Plans that are governmental,
church-related, maintained solely to comply with applicable worker's compensation laws,
unemployment compensation laws or disability insurance laws, unfunded excess benefit
plans, or plans maintained outside the United States for nonresidents, are expressly ex-
cluded. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1985).
8 See H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 4639, 4639 ("committee has been constrained to recognize the voluntary nature
of private retirement plans"). Since Congress deliberately chose to retain a voluntary sys-
tem of participation by employers, it could not impose costly minimum benefit standards
for fear of discouraging employers. Id. at 5, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4643.
See also Note, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: Policies and Problems, 26
SYRACUSE L. REV. 539, 555-57 (1975). "As long as the private system remains voluntary in
nature, the level of retirement income security provided will depend upon the willingness
of employers to create plans . I..." d  at 555.
119 See generally Note, ERISA Preemption of State Mandated-Provider Laws, 1985 DUKE L.J.
1194 passim (1985). Discussion of state mandated-provider laws is beyond the scope of this
Note.
'0 See supra note 148 (discussing voluntary nature of employer participation in employee
benefit systems).
8I See supra note 2 and accompanying text (detailing tremendous growth in number of
employee benefit plan beneficiaries as well as amount of assets involved).
1I" See SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, IN-
TERIM REPORT OF ACTIVITIES OF THE PRIVATE WELFARE AND PENSION PLAN STUDY, S. REP. No.
634, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1971). The private pension system, social security benefits, as
well as any individual savings form the basis for post-retirement income. Id.
Several factors influenced congressional enactment of ERISA. As noted previously, one
such factor was the tremendous growth in employee benefit plans. See supra notes 1-2 and
accompanying text. Another major factor was the increasingly interstate nature of these
plans and their impact upon the national economy, as well as the reliance on these plans by
millions of employees and their families. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1985). Further, pension
plans constitute the largest lump sum of private capital in the United States. See Gregory,
supra note 3, at 435.
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programs.
The creation of employee benefit plans requires a substantial
outlay of capital by an employer.15 Subrogation serves as the sole
method of potential defrayal of a portion of the employer's cost,
and will decrease the amount of money needed from the employer
to revitalize a depleted fund.""
States impede the congressional purpose of ERISA by disallow-
ing the equitable remedy of subrogation in ERISA employee ben-
efit plans.' 55 In other words, through antisubrogation laws, states
hinder voluntary participation in employee benefit plans. It is sub-
mitted that the increase in cost to the employer resulting from the
state-imposed bar from subrogation will render some previously
153 See Rothstein, Refusing To Employ Smokers: Good Public Health or Bad Public Policy?, 62
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 940, 954 (1987) (construing U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 1984 Em-
ployee Benefits, Table 6-2 (1985)). According to the United States Chamber of Commerce,
"employee benefits comprise 36.6% of total payroll costs." Id.
164 See Note, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: Policies and Problems, 26
SYRACUSE L. REV. 539, 558 (1975). It is asserted that Congress was very much interested in
defraying an employer's cost of creating an employee benefit plan:
[Tihe committee is aware that . . .unduly large increases in costs could impede the
growth and improvement of the private retirement system. For this reason, in the
case of those requirements which add to the cost of financing retirement plans, the
committee has sought to adopt provisions which strike a balance between providing
meaningful reform and keeping costs within reasonable limits.
Id. (quoting HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, PRIVATE PENSION TAX REFORM, H.R. REP.
No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 4670, 4682).
15' See supra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing voluntary nature of employer
creation of employee benefit plans).
It can be inferred that Congress refused to consider the implementation of a compulsory
private pension system, since no committee reports or other legislative history disclose seri-
ous discussion of anything other than a voluntary system. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4639 passim (no discus-
sion of compulsory system reported).
Encouraging employer participation in employee benefit plans was a primary objective of
ERISA. See Note, supra note 154, at 558. "The dilemma facing Congress was to rid the
private pension system of its inequities without discouraging employers from establishing
plans because of overly stringent governmental controls." Id. It is further asserted that
there are several policy reasons for avoiding a compulsory system:
First, the costs of providing minimum compulsory pension benefits may produce ex-
cessive financial strain on certain employers, and on the economic system as a whole.
Second, a compulsory private system might deprive specific plans of the flexibiltiy
required to develop benefits which reflect the needs and desires of different social
and occupational groups in the population .... Finally, it has been suggested that a
compulsory system has serious "welfare state" implications in terms of individual
initiative, limited government, collective bargaining and the private enterprise eco-
nomic system.
Id. at 557 n.131.
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willing participants incapable of meeting their increased obliga-
tion. It is further suggested that the voluntary creation of em-
ployee benefit plans will likely decrease.
CONCLUSION
As exemplified by the recent circuit split in Baxter and Holliday,
the scope of the preemption clause of ERISA is far from conclu-
sively determined. Despite the clear and convincing legislative in-
tent of a broad preemptive sweep, and despite United States Su-
preme Court interpretations recognizing this intent, some federal
courts still insist on a narrow application of section 514. By utiliz-
ing this limited interpretation to uphold state antisubrogation laws
which impact upon ERISA employee benefit plans, the Third Cir-
cuit in FMC Corp. v. Holliday rejected the contemplation of both
Congress and the Supreme Court. In the process, the continued
voluntary formation of employee benefit programs by employers
is threatened. As stated by Congressman Dent, the broad preemp-
tive force of section 514 of ERISA was created to eliminate "the
threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation ..
S."15 Surely there is no greater threat than the extinction of em-
ployee health and welfare benefit plans.
Christopher R. Carroll & Kathleen A. Deegan
'H See 120 CONG. REc. 29,197 (1974).
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